Assistant Professor
Department of Government
University of Texas at Austin
smoser@austin.utexas.edu
``Dominance and Challenging in Abstract Systems''
Working paper
In many theories of group choice a dominance relation expressing the ability of alternatives to "defeat" or replace others is the central object on which various solutions are based. I present and argue for the use of a particular sub-relation of the dominance relation called the ultimate challenges relation as a basis for solutions in abstract systems. This derived relation is the largest sub-relation with the property that all win-sets are "self-consistent" with the ultimate challenges relation itself. When a group collectively and iteratively considers alternatives and compares them to possible replacements, the challenges relation is a useful and appropriate device for reasoning about stable outcomes. It reflects a form of iterated reasoning about the replaceability of a status quo by another alternative. Based on this new relation I propose a new solution in abstract systems. I apply it to cooperative majority voting which results in a modification to the tournament equilibrium set, potentially addressing some issues in the original solution.
``Modeling Preferences Using
Legislative Voting in the Presence of Missing Data'' (with Abel Rodrguez)
forthcoming, Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society (Series C)
Strategic abstentions are a poorly
understood feature of legislative voting records. This paper discusses
a spatial model for legislators revealed preferences that accounts for
abstentions driven by competing principals. A particularly appealing
feature of our model is its ability to identify legislators that
consistently engage in strategic abstentions, as well as bills for
which the position of the legislator in policy space is a key driver of
abstentions. We illustrate the performance of our model through the
analysis of two datasets, one from the period leading to the Second
Reform Act of 1867 in the UK House of Commons, and one from the second
session of the 108th U.S. Senate.
``Heresthetics
and Choice from Tournaments'' (with Molly
Fenn, Ran Ji, Michelle Maiden, and Melanie Panosian)
Journal of Theoretical Politics, Advance online
publication, 2015
doi:10.1177/0951629814568398
Moser et al. (2009) provide one
formalization of heresthetics - the art of political strategy - in
collective choice settings. In doing so they introduce the
heresthetically stable set as the set of outcomes least susceptible to
manipulation of issue dimension. In this paper we examine the
heresthetically stable set as a tournament solution, establishing some
basic properties it possesses. In addition, we relate the
heresthetically stable set to other tournament solutions, notably the
Weak Uncovered and refinements thereof.
``Coordination
in a changing environment'' (with Alexander Matros)
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 112:
64–84, 2015.
doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2014.12.026
In this article we consider a model where
boundedly rational agents choose both which coordination game to play
and what action to take in that game, when their information and
mobility are limited and changes over time. We completely characterize
both short-run and long-run outcomes. There are multiple types of
short-run predictions in which agents may be at different locations,
taking different actions. In the long-run, however, all agents are at
the same location and take the same action in that game. The long-run
prediction is unique and globally efficient most of the time.
``The Domestic Politics of
Strategic Retrenchment, Power Shifts, and Preventive War'' (with Terrence
Chapman and Patrick
McDonald)
International Studies Quarterly, 59(1): 133–144, 2015.
doi:/10.1111/isqu.12154
We present a formal model of international
bargaining between two states in which one government must negotiate
with a domestic opposition faction to secure tax revenue to fund
military spending. It examines how robust the international order is to
random domestic political crises that activate a stark tradeoff to a
governing coalition: fiscal relief to stave off domestic revolution can
simultaneously undermine the larger international political order via
sizable shifts in the relative distribution of military power between
states. We find that the likelihood of preventive war is shaped by two
key domestic conditions: the distribution of income within an economy
and the relative economic stake that opposition groups possess in
international settlements.
Supplemental Information here.
``Taking
the Leap: Voting, Rhetoric, and the Determinants of Electoral Reform''
(with Andrew
Reeves)
Legislative Studies Quarterly, 39,(4): 467-502, 2014.
doi:10.1111/lsq.12055
The Second Reform Act ushered in the age of democratic politics in the UKs by expanding the voting franchise to include the working classes and providing new representation to industrialized cities. The circumstances of its passage provide an opportunity to analyze mechanisms of electoral reform. Explanations of democratic electoral reform often focus on constituency-level and elite partisan behavior. Using unsupervised topic model analysis of parliamentary debates and quantitative analysis of roll call votes, we investigate why electoral reform successfully passed the House of Commons in 1867. Specifically we consider why reform passed under a Conservative government while a similar bill failed under a Liberal government despite no election or change in membership of the House of Commons. We find that party, not constituency, is responsible for explaining votes on reform and that, ultimately, it was the reduction in the number of aspects in the debate over reform that allowed Conservatives to pass bill.
Supporting Information here.
``Binary Relations from
Tournament Solutions, and Back Again'' (with Daniel Allcock )
(working paper)
We present a generalization of an abstract
model of group choice in which the process of collective choice is
modeled as a cooperative process of consideration and reconsideration
of alternatives. We develop a general framework for studying choice
from a finite set of alternatives, using the idea that one alternative
may challenge or displace from consideration another in the course of a
group choosing. From this binary relation the challenges relation new
tournament solutions are obtained, the limit of which is the central
object of the present study. The model presented generalizes that of
contestation [Schwartz, 1990] and we characterize the set of alter-
natives that can be chosen in a collective choice setting when the
process of collective choice is viewed as cooperatively considering and
reconsidering alternatives. Basic properties of the family of
tournament solutions studied are given as well.
``Orderings
Based on the Banks Set: Some New Transitive Scoring Methods for
Multi-Criteria Decision Making''
Complexity, Advance online publication, 2014.
doi:/10.1002/cplx.21527
This paper introduces new methods for
ranking alternatives in collective choice situations. The new methods
reflect aspects of robustness of alternatives when voters vote
strategically, and discriminate among elements of the Banks set [Banks,
1985]. The new scoring methods are compared to traditional scoring
methods and related to the amount of intransitivity (specifically, the
size of the top-cycle and the size of the Banks set) in collective
choice settings. The new scores are shown to measure important aspects
of alternatives not captured by extant scoring methods.
``A Note on Contestation-Based
Tournament Solutions''
Social Choice and Welfare, 41(1):
133–143, 2014
doi:10.1007/s00355-012-0672-4
This note introduces a family of new
tournament solutions based on the contestation relation [Schwartz,
1990] and relates them to existing refinements of the Banks set.
Additionally, the connection between the contestation relation and
general tournament solutions is discussed.
``Informational
Consequences of Agenda Procedures'' -- 2009
(last updated July 2011)
(working paper)
Agenda procedures are an important aspect
of political decision making in legislatures. This paper compares
different agenda forms and evaluates them on their ability to
amalgamate information. I model voters with private information, but
subject to party pressures, voting in a common value environment and
use this model to compare different agenda forms. Special attention is
paid to two agenda forms commonly used in practice: the amendment
agenda and the sequential elimination agenda. I find that amendment
agendas select superior outcomes more often than sequential elimination
agendas when there is much ex-ante uncertainty; that the amendment
agenda is better able to extract information from votes, but this
information can be to the detriment of a group if information is of
poor quality.
``The Structure of
Heresthetical Power'' (with John W. Patty and Elizabeth
Maggie Penn)
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 21(2): 139-159, 2009.
doi:10.1177/0951629808100761
(This version corrects the typos printed
in the appendix)
This article considers manipulation of
collective choice in such environments, a potential alternative is
powerful only to the degree that its introduction can affect the
collective decision. Using the Banks set (Banks, 1985), we present and
characterize alternatives that can, and those that can not, affect
sophisticated collective decision-making. Along with offering two
substantive findings about political manipulation and a link between
our results and Riker's concept of heresthetic, we define a new
tournament solution concept that refines the Banks set, which we refer
to as the heresthetically stable set.
``Communication and Coordination'' (with John Miller)
Complexity,
9(5): 31–40, 2004
doi:10.1002/cplx.20034
Remarkable levels of coordination are
observed among social agents; yet the exact mechanisms by which such
agents coordinate are not well understood. Here we examine the role of
communication in achieving coordination--in particular, does endowing
agents with the ability to communicate lead to more favorable outcomes?
To pursue this question we employ an adaptive model of strategically
communicating agents (Miller et al., 2002) playing the Stag Hunt game.
We find that communication plays a key role in the ability of agents to
reach and maintain superior coordination. In the absence of
communication, agents tend to get trapped at the inferior coordination
point. However, once agents reach a particular strategic threshold,
sending even a priori meaningless messages serves to increase the
likelihood that the population will coordinate on the superior outcome.
While the system spends the majority of its time with well-coordinated
behavior, it is not static--such periods are often punctuated by brief
transitions in which the system switches to the alternative
coordination point. We analyze the various mechanisms that account for
this dynamic behavior and find that there are a few critical pathways
by which the system transitions from one coordination point to another.
Communication plays a critical, yet short-lived, role in one key
pathway. Our analysis suggests that giving agents the ability to
communicate even a priori meaningless messages may promote the
emergence of a rich, and often robust, ``ecology'' of behaviors that
allows agents to achieve new, and in this case superior, outcomes.